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FOREWORD
"Yet he is actually not farfrom each one of us, for

'In him we live and move and have our being'. .

."

The Apostle Paul,'
quoting Epimenides' poem Cretica (6th century B.C.)
We see the appearance of order all around us. At every level of human
observation-from molecular to galactic and beyond-we are confronted
by precision, beauty, and an eerie resonance with our own mind. Moreover,
further investigation reveals what looks like direction, purpose-even
design. Is this perception real or just an illusion? And, most importantly
for this Symposium, may that question be asked--or answered-in a public
school?
This year marks the bicentennial of the birth of Charles Darwin. It is
also the 150th anniversary of his culture-changing book, On the Origin of
Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured
Races in the Struggle for Life. In this important year, much of academia is
celebrating the significance of Darwin's work. But some are also seriously
critiquing it. Among them is a group of scientists who suggest that various
biological phenomena cannot be fully explained by Darwin's theory of
random mutation and natural selection. Rather, these scientists propose that
many aspects of the biological world can only be explained in terms of
purposeful engineering. Their alternative explanation has come to be
known as intelligent design (ID).
Over the last several years, this debate between those who affirm
Darwin's theory and those who question it has ignited a firestorm of
controversy. Following the unfortunate path of many of America's
important social issues, the debate was eventually brought before a federal
court in Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District.2 Kitzmiller involved
many of the issues of this Symposium: May evolution be questioned, or ID
taught, in public schools? Is ID religion? Is it science? Is it both, or
perhaps neither? And, What should we do about it? Yet, as in most cases
involving scientific or social issues outside judges' expertise, the court's
lengthy opinion did little to settle the public debate.'
1. Acts 17:27-28.
2. Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 (M.D. Pa.2005).
3. Moreover, investigation revealed that the opinion's discussion of "whether ID is science"
was largely cut-and-pasted from the anti-ID plaintiffs' proposed order. See John G. West & David
K. DeWolf, A Comparison of Judge Jones' Opinion in Kitzmiller v. Dover with Plaintiffs'
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In the wake of Kitzmiller, many sources weighed in from all sides of the
debate. The pro-ID Discovery Institute published a critique of the court's
decision, entitled Traipsing into Evolution.4 Later, attorney/actor Ben
Stein's documentary movie Expelled alleged that pro-ID professors were
being ostracized by the science establishment. The National Center for
Science Education, an opponent of teaching ID in public schools, responded
with ExpelledExposed.com, a critique of Stein's critique. Other pro- and
anti-ID groups joined the fray, all adding fuel to the public fire.
In February 2009, Liberty University School of Law hosted a
Symposium to examine the legal side of the debate. The question for
discussion: May ID be taught in public schools? Several speakers'
responses are published in this issue. They represent multiple spokes in the
wheel of the debate; while the authors concur broadly on some points, they
diverge on others. The following is a summary of their articles, comparing
and contrasting their views on important issues within the debate.
The Meaning of "Religion"
The U.S. Supreme Court has never given a comprehensive definition of
"religion" for purposes of the Religion Clauses.6 The Court has preferred
instead to categorize particular activities or beliefs as either religious or
non-religious. Nevertheless, in non-constitutional cases, the Court has
given some guidance regarding its understanding of what constitutes
religion, while also commenting broadly on the concerns and factors that
may bear upon its decision in a given case. Moreover, lower federal and
state courts have given more detailed analysis to the matter of defining
religion. Based on these jurisprudential clues, the Symposium authors
propose various definitions of religion for constitutional cases in general
and public school decisions in particular.
John Calvert advocates a broad, "functional" definition of religion. In
his view, "religion" means a set of beliefs regarding matters of ultimate
Proposed "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" (Dec. 12, 2006), httpi/www.discovery.org/
scnpts/viewDB/filesDB-download.php?command=download&id=l 186; see also Casey Luskin,
Analogical Legal Reasoning and Legal Policy Argumentation: A Response to Darwinist Defenders
of Judge Jones' Copying from the ACLU (Jan. 22, 2007), http://www.discovery.org/scripts/
viewDB/filesDB-download.php?command=download&id=1209 (arguing that such copying is

disfavored by courts).
4. DAVD K.

DEWOLF ET AL., TRAIPSING INTO EVOLUTION: INTELLIGENT DESIGN AND

THE KrrZMILLER V. DOVER DECISION (2006).
5. EXPELLED: No INTELLIGENCE ALLOWED (Premise Media 2008).

6. Smith v. Bd.of Sch. Comm'rs of Mobile County, 655 F. Supp. 939, 975 (S.D. Ala.),
rev'd on othergrounds, 827 F.2d 684 (11 th Cir. 1987).
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concern that function in the lives of their adherents analogously to
traditionaltheistic beliefs. He asserts that this definition includes beliefs
regarding the cause, origin, nature, and purpose of life, as these are the
ultimate "matters of ultimate concern." This definition also includes not
merely beliefs in a deity, but also beliefs about the existence of a deity.
According to this perspective, belief and disbelief are functionally
equivalent. Moreover, because "secular" is defined residually as that which
falls outside religion, a broader definition of "religion" results in a narrower
definition of "secular," and vice versa.
Calvert gives several reasons for this broad definition of religion.
Initially, he explains that although religion and science may have been
separate, mutually exclusive subject matters as late as the nineteenth
century, there is now substantial overlap between them. This is because,
first, the proliferation of non-Western, nontraditional, and especially nontheistic belief systems in this country in the last century necessitates a more
inclusive understanding of what constitutes a religion.
Second, the
nineteenth-century expansion of science into the study of life's origins
caused science to cover ground previously occupied primarily by religion.
Thus, religion and science are no longer mutually exclusive, but now
overlap when they address origins.
Further, Calvert argues that a broad definition of religion is needed
because a narrow, theistic definition excludes non- or anti-theistic belief
systems, creating an inherent viewpoint bias at the definitional level. This
bias, in turn, violates the doctrine of religious neutrality that the Supreme
Court has repeatedly said is required by the Establishment Clause. In
addition, such a gerrymandered definition of religion denies equal
protection to non- or anti-theistic religious groups by giving preference to
functionally equivalent theistic groups. Courts can avoid these viewpoint
bias and equal protection problems by evaluating only the subject matter
(content) and function of belief systems.
As a corollary, Calvert points out that the word "religion" cannot have
one meaning in the Establishment Clause and another in the Free Exercise
Clause. Similarly, a non-theistic group cannot label its views as religious to
gain the protections provided by both Religion Clauses, while
simultaneously labeling its views as non-religious to avoid the
Establishment Clause's prohibition of governmental endorsement. The
constitutional definition of religion must be both consistent and consistently
applied.
Moreover, Calvert proposes that to qualify as religious, beliefs must
form a comprehensive system. This prevents an isolated teaching that
happens to comport with one or more religious belief systems from being
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mistakenly labeled as religious. Professor Johnny Buckles and Casey
Luskin seem to agree that a proposition is not necessarily religious simply
because it harmonizes with a particular religious view.
Calvert also notes that his definition of religion is objective, in that it
does not look to whether the holder of the belief characterizes the belief as
religious. Finally, when a court applies the Endorsement test's "reasonable,
objective observer" standard, the hypothetical observer must be thought of
as understanding the meaning of "religion" according to the legal
definition. Thus, the observer must be presumed to have in mind the broad,
functional definition of religion, and not a narrower, colloquial one.
Professor Johnny Buckles also surveys Supreme Court case law
regarding the meaning of religion. Buckles concludes that no precise
definition can be formulated. However, he pieces together clues from the
Court's language and synthesizes them into three characteristics that
identify a religion: (1) a relational perspective (between humans and a deity
or simply between humans), (2) a devotional and moral orientation, and (3)
(often) a doctrinal grounding.
Is Evolution or ID Religious?
John Calvert argues that because the question of whether biological life
has a natural or intelligent cause is included within the above-described
category of "matters of ultimate concern," this question is inherently
religious. In turn, because both evolution and ID attempt to answer this
question, both approaches are religious. Conversely, Calvert would
categorize as "purely secular" such subjects as mathematics, modern
foreign languages, physical science, and physical education, because they
generally do not address "matters of ultimate concern."
Professor Johnny Buckles and Casey Luskin disagree. According to
their understandings of "religion," neither evolution nor ID is inherently
religious. In Buckles' view, neither evolution nor ID, taken by itself, meets
religion's three characteristics: neither has a relational perspective, a
devotional and moral orientation, or a doctrinal grounding. Although both
may be foundational to various metaphysical conclusions, the theories
themselves are not inherently religious. Luskin concurs, arguing that
teaching evolution is not an endorsement of atheism or secular humanism.
Based on these conclusions, it appears that Buckles' and Luskin's views of
what constitutes "religion" are somewhat narrower than Calvert's.
Buckles also highlights a variety of positions regarding evolution among
theistic religious groups and individuals. He shows that current theological
conceptions of origins are not monolithic, but occupy various points along a
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broad spectrum of degrees of compatibility with evolution. Based on this
range of opinions, he concludes that evolution and Christianity are not
necessarily and inherently in conflict.
Luskin focuses on a slightly different Establishment Clause problem:
anti-ID academics' propensity to attack ID as "religious." Luskin argues
that these affirmative displays of disapproval of supposedly "religious"
explanations of origins on the basis that they are religious violate the
Establishment Clause. Specifically, he contends that this practice violates
the Lemon test's prohibition against inhibiting religion. On this point,
Luskin's analysis aligns closely with Buckles' view that a school board's
forbidding the teaching of ID based on its religious implications may
violate the Establishment Clause.
However, Luskin observes that anti-ID educators also tend to oppose ID
with arguments regarding its scientific correctness. He thus brings to light
a dilemma that confronts anti-ID educators: either ID is religious and thus
constitutionally may not be affirmatively opposed or inhibited in public
schools, or ID is not religious and thus constitutionally may be endorsed in
public schools. Also, under the Establishment Clause, these educators may
not seek to rebut ID on a scientific basis, while simultaneously prohibiting
others from advocating ID on the ground that it is "religious."
Constitutionally, anti-ID educators cannot have their cake and eat it too.
Luskin also contends that under the Establishment Clause, educators may
not propose or advance theological implications of either evolution or ID.
Finally, Luskin argues that public school teachers may not advocate proevolution religious viewpoints, whether theistic or non-theistic. Calvert
also notes a tendency of anti-ID educators to enlist liberal mainline
churches to give evolution religious respectability. Luskin concludes that
these practices violate the Lemon test, the Endorsement test, and the
neutrality doctrine that transcends the various tests. Luskin also provides
many examples of these practices from public school curricula and other
documents.
Is ID Science?
John Calvert posits that true science is characterized by objectivity, not
orthodoxy. He argues that because ID is merely an observation based on an
open-ended inductive inquiry into the evidence, unbounded by naturalistic
fences, ID is not an orthodoxy and thus is science.
Conversely, Calvert contends that one of the chief institutional barriers
to ID-methodological naturalism---is an orthodoxy and thus does not
belong within the category of science. Methodological naturalism (MN) is
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the exclusion of any possibility of non-natural or intelligent causes from
scientific inquiry. Calvert points out that MN is not a testable, a posteriori
conclusion based on evidence. Rather, it is a methodological convention,
an a priori assumption in certain types of scientific inquiry. Thus, any
conclusions derived from such an inquiry are necessarily tentative, because
their accuracy depends on the truth of the underlying, untested assumption.
But Calvert finds that science students are not told this. Rather, their
teachers put forward MN as an unquestionable fact, a dogma of scientific
academia. Moreover, scientists defend MN with an Inquisitional zeal that
will not tolerate critical analysis. Accordingly, Calvert argues, MN is an
orthodoxy, an assumption based on faith, and thus cannot be categorized as
scientific.
Moreover, Calvert contends that MN actually impedes scientific
progress. For example, he observes that evolutionary biology, like crime
scene investigation, is a historical science that depends on ruling out
competing hypotheses. However, MN bars some relevant hypotheses from
the start, thus protecting the remaining ones from healthy competition.
Professor Barbara Mouly's article also points out the inherent circularity of
excluding ID on the basis of MN.
Furthermore, Calvert argues that MN is in tension with the scientific
method itself.
The scientific method was developed to remove
preconceptions from the scientific process, but MN inserts them back into
it. Also, while MN is an exclusive working hypothesis in origins science, it
is not adhered to in various operational sciences. For example, biology
presumes that organisms have a function, but MN provides no grounds for
this presumption.
Similarly, Professor Johnny Buckles believes that although MN is
important to scientific inquiry, exclusive MN is neither necessary nor
necessarily beneficial to the scientific process. Buckles proposes an
inclusive form of MN that would leave the door open for non-natural
causes. Under this view, ID's possible implication of non-natural agency
does not exclude it from the category of science.
Edward Sisson writes his article to trial judges presiding in ID cases. He
highlights the importance of conducting disinterested intellectual inquiry,
independent from popular opinion. By extension, his exhortations would
apply to lawyers, law students, and all others who would be leaders in
society.
Sisson argues first that wise judges must be careful to take into account
the voice of the dissident minority. This is needed, first, because
majoritarianism is irrelevant to the search for truth. And second, only with
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the benefit of considering opposing perspectives can judges achieve the
quality of decision making that is needed in sensitive, controversial areas.
Turning to the science, Sisson focuses on evidence of ID in molecular
biology. Writing from an MIT architecture graduate's perspective, he
considers several pieces of molecular biology that do not fit well into
evolution's puzzle. He also summarizes the process of DNA mutation
needed to produce a novel protein, showing the number of filtering steps
that would have to be overcome to produce a beneficial new protein.
Probably Sisson's most important contribution is his insightful analysis
of sociological forces influencing scientific academia. He explains the
battle, begun in the late eighteenth century, between scientific and religious
institutions to provide a culturally dominant "creation story." The group
that gains the greatest public acceptance of its explanation of human
origins, Sisson observes, also gains the greatest "market share" of the
public's attention, respect, and funding. Thus, he argues, scientific
academia has an institutional self-interest in maintaining dominance. This
especially means keeping out all ideas that would lend credence to its
challengers.
Furthermore, Sisson highlights examples of ways in which the scientific
community's consensus has been wrong in the past, and of how
begrudgingly old theories die. Last, he crystallizes several rules that are not
necessary to scientific inquiry but that he believes scientific academia uses
to protect its sociological interests:
(1) old theories can be let go of only when a better theory is put
forward;
(2) stare decisis applies to science, raising ever higher the burden
of proof for competing new theories the longer the old one has
been in place;
(3) scientific merit can be established only by consensus of
experts, not by public discourse and debate; and
(4) questioning voices must be silenced by social pressure.
Finally, Professor Barbara Mouly argues for the plausibility of ID from
principles of causation. She observes that both tort law's rules of causation
and the lID hypothesis rely on probability theory and statistical analysis.
Thus reasoning by analogy, she brings insights from tort law into the ID
debate. She argues that although these tort rules are necessarily imprecise,
they are grounded on universal principles of logic and common sense.

HeinOnline -- 3 Liberty U.L Rev. 209 2009

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 3:203

What To Do About It
John Calvert observes that government-sponsored education can treat
religious subject matter in only one of two ways: (1) exclude it, or (2) retain
it and treat it objectively and neutrally. However, an option the government
does not have is to retain the subject matter but treat it non-neutrally by
allowing only one view. Yet this is exactly what happens when public
schools address the inherently religious subject of origins but include only
evolution, Calvert argues. To restore religious neutrality to the teaching of
origins, public schools must include ID in that teaching.
Professor Johnny Buckles analyzes the constitutionality of either
requiring or forbidding the teaching of ID, evaluating both policies under
the Lemon test and the Endorsement test. In particular, he reviews the
Supreme Court's two cases on origins-Eppersonv. Arkansas and Edwards
v. Aguillard-and explains his view of the proper interpretation of these
cases' holdings. Based on this interpretation, Buckles argues that requiring
the teaching of ID is not necessarily inconsistent with either case's
approach. Rather, the constitutionality of such a requirement depends on
certain case-specific factors. Furthermore, he concludes thatforbidding the
teaching of ID may also meet or fail the Lemon test, again based on casespecific factors. He explains in detail what those factors are. Ultimately,
Buckles concludes that under the relevant case law, requiring the teaching
of ID in public schools may be constitutionally permissible in certain cases.
He also finds that forbidding the teaching of ID may be impermissible in
certain cases.
The Liberty University Law Review thanks the authors for their
contributions to the ongoing worldwide debate over evolution and
intelligent design. The Law Review also thanks Liberty University School
of Law and Liberty University for their support of this Symposium.
Finally, the following prayerful muse is offered that we may approach
this subject with humility and awe.
0 Lord, our Lord,
how majestic is your name in all the earth!7
We give honor to you,
for you have createdall things,
andfor your glory they are created.
7. Psalm 8:1.
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We cannot searchthe highest heavens,
orplumb the depths of the deepest sea,
but you, 0 Lord,are there,
andyour creation opens before us like aflower in full bloom,
singing its perpetualsong andpreaching its silent sermon to all
mankind
of the glory ofyour name.
0 God, when we think about ourselves, how small we are,
our own understandingis dwarfed by the complexity ofyour
world aroundus,
and we ask, "Who are we?"
and, "What have we done to deserve your attention?"
But then the light ofyour glory comforts us once more,
for even the sparrows'plight is within the breadth ofyour
infinite mind and care;
how much more we, 0 we of littlefaith?
And resting in the wonder of this assurance,we declare,
Barukh attah Adonai, Eloheinu, melekh ha'olam,
shehakol nihiyah bid'varo,
"Blessed areyou, 0 Lord our God, King of the universe,
who brought all things into being by his word."
This reflection we bring in the name ofyour Son Jesus, who is the
Christ,
by whom, through whom, andfor whom all things were
created,
andwho is before all things,
and in whom all things are held together.
0 Lord, our Lord,
how majestic is your name in all the earth!

Hosea M. Horneman
Articles and Book Reviews Editor
Lynchburg, Virginia
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